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INTRODUCTION 
Thank you, Dean Martin, and thank you to the members of the 
Fordham Urban Law Journal for putting together this event and 
giving me the opportunity to speak to you all today. 
What I would like to do in the time I have is to try and provide a 
bit of background for some of the debate on the Second Amendment 
that you will hear later today.  To that end, I am going to try to 
summarize how the Supreme Court has interpreted the Second 
Amendment, most importantly focusing on the 2008 and 2010 
decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller1 and McDonald v. City of 
Chicago.2  Please know that I speak today not on behalf of the 
Department of Justice or the United States Attorney’s Office, and 
any opinions or beliefs that I express are my own and not necessarily 
those of the Department. 
I.  THE TEXT OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
A natural place to start is with the text of the amendment itself.  
The Second Amendment reads: “A well regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to 
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”3  The amendment 
contains two parts:  the prefatory language, “A well regulated Militia, 
being necessary to the security of a free State,” and the operative 
part, “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”  How to interpret the relationship between the prefatory 
language and the operative language is the cornerstone of the debate 
in the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in District of Columbia v. 
Heller.4  Does the operative language, “the right of the people to keep 
and bear arms, shall not be infringed,” only apply when arms are kept 
or carried in connection with a military purpose?  Or does the 
prefatory language concerning the necessity of a militia merely 
provide the backdrop against which the Founders felt it necessary to 
codify an individual right of “the people” to keep and bear arms—
whether or not the use of arms is related to military use? 
The Supreme Court did not address this issue of linguistics and the 
Founders’ intent until the Heller decision in 2008.  Commentators on 
both sides of this issue have argued that the Court’s silence on this 
 
 1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 2. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).  
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. II.  
 4. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 577–78, 598–600; id. at 643–44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
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topic suggests that one way or the other, before Heller there really 
was no serious debate about the meaning of the Second Amendment.  
Depending on your viewpoint, the Court in Heller, in finding that the 
Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to bear arms in 
non-military conduct, either affirmed a well-accepted principle or, on 
the other hand, expanded the scope of the right under the Second 
Amendment, despite the plain language concerning the militia, to 
create a constitutionally protected individual right to bear arms when 
such a constitutional right had never existed before nor was intended 
to exist by the Founders. 
II.  SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ANALYZING THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT 
Interestingly, before Heller and McDonald, the Second 
Amendment rarely was a source of much interest for the Supreme 
Court.  Indeed, prior to the 2008 Heller decision, the meaning and 
scope of the Second Amendment seems only to have been the focus 
of three Supreme Court decisions.5  I will discuss each of those briefly. 
First, in 1876, the Supreme Court in United States v. Cruikshank,6 a 
few years after passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, addressed 
whether the Second Amendment applies by its own force to anyone 
other than the Federal Government.7  The Court concluded that the 
Second Amendment means no more than that the right to keep and 
bear arms shall not be infringed by Congress, and that states were 
free to protect or restrict that right under their police powers.8 
In 1886, the Supreme Court in Presser v. Illinois upheld a state law 
that forbade bodies of men to associate together as military 
organizations, or to drill or parade with arms in cities and towns 
unless authorized by law.9  The Court upheld the law and affirmed its 
holding in Cruikshank that the Second Amendment is only a 
limitation upon the power of Congress and the national government, 
and not upon that of the states.10  The Court also found that the state 
 
 5. See generally Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 
252 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
 6. 92 U.S. 542.  
 7. See id. at 550–51.  
 8. See id. at 553.  
 9. Presser, 116 U.S. at 253.  
 10. See id. at 264–65.  
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law did not violate a citizen’s rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.11 
In 1927 and 1934, Congress passed what Justice Stevens’s 
dissenting opinion in Heller characterized as the first federal laws 
directly restricting civilian use of firearms.12  The 1927 Act prohibited 
mail delivery of firearms capable of being concealed on one’s 
person.13  The 1934 Act prohibited the possession of sawed off 
shotguns and machine guns.14 
The 1934 Act came under review in the 1939 Supreme Court 
decision United States v. Miller,15 the third and final Second 
Amendment Supreme Court decision preceding Heller and 
McDonald.  In Miller, the Supreme Court upheld the 1934 Act 
outlawing possession of, among other things, a short barrel shotgun.16  
The Supreme Court reasoned that since there was no evidence that a 
short barrel shotgun has “some reasonable relationship to the 
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say 
that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear 
such an instrument.”17  As I will discuss in a moment, how to interpret 
the holding in Miller is one of the central disagreements between the 
majority and dissent in Heller. 
III.  THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA V. HELLER 
So let’s discuss Heller.  In the pivotal 5-4 decision, the Supreme 
Court reviewed District of Columbia ordinances that generally 
prohibited the possession of handguns.18  Specifically, it was a crime in 
Washington D.C. “to carry an unregistered firearm, and the 
registration of handguns [was] prohibited.”19  “District of Columbia 
law also require[d] residents to keep their lawfully owned firearms, 
 
 11. See id. at 266.   
 12. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 675 (2008) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 13. See id. (citing Act of Feb. 8, 1927, ch. 75, 44 Stat. 1059). 
 14. See id. (citing National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (codified as 
amended at 26 U.S.C. 5801-5849 (2006))). 
 15. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).  
 16. See id. at 178.  
 17. Id.  
 18. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 574.  
 19. Id. at 574-75.  
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such as registered long guns, ‘unloaded and disassembled or bound by 
a trigger lock or similar device’ . . . .”20 
The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, held that the 
Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess a firearm 
unconnected with service in militia, and to use that firearm for 
traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.21  
Scalia reasoned that the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause—“A 
well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State”—did not limit or expand the operative clause of the 
amendment—“the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall 
not be infringed.”22  Scalia wrote that the operative clause’s text and 
history—including its legislative history, post-ratification 
commentary, and the limited jurisprudence analyzing the Second 
Amendment that I just very briefly discussed—all support a reading 
that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep 
and bear arms.23  Scalia reasoned that the prefatory language 
announced the purpose for which the right to bear arms was codified, 
but did not contain all components of the right.24  Scalia wrote, “[T]he 
threat that the new Federal Government would destroy the citizens’ 
militia by taking away their arms was the reason that right—unlike 
some other English rights—was codified in a written Constitution.”25  
Scalia noted, however, that “[t]he prefatory clause does not suggest 
that preserving the militia was the only reason Americans valued the 
ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even more important for 
self-defense and hunting.”26 
The majority found that the handgun ban amounted to a 
prohibition on an entire class of firearms that Americans choose for 
the lawful purpose of self-defense.27  The majority opinion noted that 
the complete prohibition of handguns would fail either intermediate 
or strict scrutiny but, interestingly, declined to adopt a specific 
standard of review.28  Scalia wrote, “[S]ince this case represents this 
Court’s first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment, one 
 
 20. Id. at 575 (quoting D.C. CODE § 7-2507.02 (2009), amended by 56 D.C. Reg. 
1365 (2009)).  
 21. See id. at 635.   
 22. Id. at 577.  
 23. See id. at 579-620. 
 24. See id. at 599.  
 25. Id.  
 26. Id.  
 27. See id. at 628. 
 28. See id. at 634-35.  
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should not expect it to clarify the entire field.”29  The Court also 
found that the requirement that any lawful firearm in the home be 
disassembled or bound by a trigger lock makes it impossible for 
citizens to use arms for the core lawful purpose of self-defense, and is 
therefore unconstitutional.30 
The majority was careful to note that, like most rights, the right 
secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.31  Not purporting 
to have made an exhaustive list, the Court mentioned some of the 
permissible restrictions on possession of firearms, namely 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by convicted felons and the 
mentally ill; laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive 
places such as schools; laws imposing conditions and qualifications on 
the commercial sale of firearms; and, in keeping with the majority’s 
reading of Miller, prohibitions on firearms that are not in common 
use at the time.32 
Returning to Miller for a moment, the 1939 case held that Congress 
may prohibit or restrict possession of guns that have no reasonable 
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated 
militia.33  The majority in Heller interpreted Miller to mean that 
certain types of weapons are not protected under the Second 
Amendment—not that a weapon must be used in connection with 
military activity to be protected—but rather that Miller asks whether 
the gun at issue is of a type that is related to the preservation or 
efficiency of the military.34  The majority went on to say that arms that 
have some relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well 
regulated militia are not necessarily those weapons that are most 
commonly used by the military but rather those that are in common 
usage at the time.35  So put another way, the majority in Heller 
interpreted Miller to hold that the Second Amendment protects an 
individual’s right to bear arms that are commonly used at that time. 
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Heller, interpreted Miller to mean 
that the Second Amendment only protects the right to bear arms 
insofar as it is connected with military usage.36  Stevens wrote: 
 
 29. Id. at 635.  
 30. See id. at 630.  
 31. See id. at 595.  
 32. See id. at 626-27.  
 33. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).  
 34. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 622-25.  
 35. See id. at 624-25.  
 36. See id. at 637-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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[I]f the Second Amendment were not limited in its coverage to 
military uses of weapons, why should the Court in Miller have 
suggested that some weapons but not others were eligible for 
Second Amendment protection?  If use for self-defense were the 
relevant standard, why did the Court not inquire into the suitability 
of a particular weapon for self-defense purposes?37 
The dissent’s disagreement over the majority’s interpretation of 
Miller spills into the heart of the dispute in Heller.  As Justice Stevens 
wrote in dissent: 
The view of the amendment we took in Miller—that it protects the 
right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes, but that it 
does not curtail the Legislature’s power to regulate the nonmilitary 
use and ownership of weapons—is both the most natural reading of 
the Amendment’s text and the interpretation most faithful to the 
history of its adoption.38 
Justice Stevens also took issue with Justice Scalia’s mode of 
statutory construction, which in the eyes of the dissent relegated the 
prefatory language concerning the militia to merely contextual 
information.39  Quoting Marbury v. Madison, Stevens wrote that “[i]t 
cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to 
be without effect.”40 
The dissent, like the majority opinion, looked at the legislative and 
post-ratification history of the amendment but came to a far different 
conclusion.41  In particular, Justice Stevens focused on James 
Madison’s consideration and rejection of potential formulations of 
the amendment that would have, in the words of Justice Stevens, 
“unambiguously protected civilian use of firearms.”42  Specifically, the 
dissent focused on proposed language from New Hampshire that 
stated, “Congress shall never disarm any Citizen unless such as are or 
have been in Actual Rebellion,”43 and proposals considered in other 
states, including Madison’s native Virginia, that defined the right to 
bear arms in more clearly personal terms.44 
 
 37. Id. at 677. 
 38. Id. at 637-38.  
 39. See id. at 643-44. 
 40. Id. at 643 (alteration in original) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 174 (1803)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 41. See id. at 641-62. 
 42. Id. at 660. 
 43. Id. at 657. 
 44. Id. at 659-60. 
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Justice Breyer joined in Justice Stevens’ dissent and also dissented 
on the ground that even if the Second Amendment could be 
construed to protect a civilian’s non-military bearing of arms, the 
Washington D.C. regulation, in the words of Justice Breyer, “which 
focuses upon the presence of handguns in high-crime urban areas, 
represents a permissible legislative response to a serious, indeed life-
threatening, problem.”45  Justice Breyer criticized the majority for not 
setting forth a standard of review and noted that if, for instance, 
“rational basis” review were the proper standard, the legislation 
would undoubtedly pass that test.46  Justice Breyer went on to write 
that adoption of a strict scrutiny standard of review—under which a 
gun law would be reviewed to determine whether it is narrowly 
tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest—would be 
impossible.47  Reasoning that since almost every gun control law will 
seek to advance a primary concern of the government (the safety of 
its citizens)—and such an interest has been determined in other cases 
to be compelling—any attempt to apply strict scrutiny would in 
practice turn into an interest balancing inquiry “with the interests 
protected by the Second Amendment on one side and the 
governmental public-safety concerns on the other, the only question 
being whether the regulation at issue impermissibly burdens the 
former in the course of advancing the latter.”48 Justice Breyer 
therefore recommended simply adopting an interest-balancing 
inquiry explicitly as the appropriate standard of review.49 
Justice Breyer concluded that in light of the compelling 
government interest in the safety of its citizens, and since self-defense 
is not the primary interest advanced by the Second Amendment—
rather, the preservation of the militia is—the Washington D.C. laws 
did not disproportionately burden Amendment-protected interests.  
Therefore, in his eyes, even assuming that the Second Amendment 
protects the right to self-defense, the Washington D.C. regulations 
pass constitutional muster.50 
After the majority holding in Heller, it is now clear that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual’s right to bear arms in the home 
for the lawful purpose of self-defense.  As I noted, the decision did 
 
 45. Id. at 681-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 46. See id. at 687-88. 
 47. See id. at 689. 
 48. Id.  
 49. See id.  
 50. See id. at 720-23.  
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leave certain areas, such as standard of review, open for debate.  The 
Heller decision also was silent on whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporated the Second Amendment right to keep and 
bear arms for the purpose of self-defense.51 
IV.  THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN MCDONALD V. CITY OF 
CHICAGO 
In 2010, the Supreme Court in McDonald addressed whether, in 
the wake of Heller, the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms fully applicable to the 
States.52 
Under review in McDonald were Chicago laws that prohibited 
handgun possession similar to the DC regulations at issue in Heller.53  
The municipalities of Chicago and Oak Park argued that their laws 
were constitutional because the Second Amendment has no 
application to the States.54 
However, Justice Alito, writing a plurality opinion for the Court, 
held that the Second Amendment right was applicable to the States 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,55 which 
provides that no State may deprive any person of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of the law.56  Justice Alito recognized 
that earlier Second Amendment opinions of the Supreme Court in 
Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller held that the Second Amendment 
applies only to the Federal Government and not to the states.57  
However, Justice Alito found that those decisions “preceded the era 
in which the Court began the process of ‘selective incorporation’ 
under the Due Process Clause, and [that the Supreme Court had] 
never previously addressed the question whether the right to keep 
and bear arms applies to the States under that theory.”58 
Applying the test set forth in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court analyzed whether the right protected 
by the Second Amendment is fundamental to the nation’s scheme of 
 
 51. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3027 (2010) (citing NRA, 
Inc. v. Vill. of Oak Park, 617 F. Supp. 2d 752, 754 (N.D. Ill. 2008)).  
 52. See id. at 3026. 
 53. See id.  
 54. See id.  
 55. See id. 
 56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 57. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030.  
 58. Id. at 3031.  
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ordered liberty;59 or applying the test from Washington v. Gluckberg, 
whether it is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” 
and, therefore, incorporated from the Bill of Rights into the 
Fourteenth Amendment and applied to the States.60  Justice Alito 
remarked, “Our decision in Heller points unmistakably to the answer.  
Self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from 
ancient times to the present day, and in Heller, we held that 
individual self-defense is ‘the central component’ of the Second 
Amendment right.”61  Justice Alito rejected the municipal 
respondents’ argument that the central component of the right was as 
a means of preserving the militia, and not self-defense.62  The plurality 
opinion then went on to recount the legislative history of the 
amendment and the post-ratification history of the amendment that 
demonstrated that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those 
fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.63 
Justice Alito also reaffirmed, as provided in Heller, that the right to 
keep and bear arms is not limitless and incorporation of the Second 
Amendment right through the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to make that right applicable to the states did not 
disturb certain longstanding regulatory measures such as prohibitions 
on the possession of firearms by felons and forbidding the carrying of 
firearms in sensitive areas such as schools.64 
Justice Thomas concurred in part with the plurality opinion and 
concurred in the judgment.65  He agreed that the Fourteenth 
Amendment makes the right to keep and bear arms, as set forth in 
the Second Amendment, fully applicable to the States but wrote 
separately because he believed that the right is incorporated, not 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but 
rather through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and 
Immunities Clause.66  The Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Fourteenth Amendment provides that a State may not “abridge the 
 
 59. See 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
 60. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
702, 721 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 61. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 
599 (2008)).  
 62. See id. at 3048.  
 63. See id. at 3037-42.  
 64. See id. at 3047. 
 65. See id. at 3058 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 66. See id. at 3059.  
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privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”67  The scope 
of rights protected under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, as 
many of you well know, has been construed rather narrowly since the 
landmark Slaughter-House Cases68 of the nineteenth century and the 
proper interpretation of that clause is an issue that has been the 
source of much scholarly debate.  Justice Thomas argued, among 
other things, that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects 
constitutionally protected rights, including the right to keep and bear 
arms.69 
There were two dissenting opinions in McDonald, again penned by 
Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer.  Much of Justice Stevens’ dissent, 
like Justices Scalia and Thomas’ concurring opinions, is spent 
analyzing the proper interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.70  
Justice Stevens argued that the Supreme Court had already decided 
in Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller that the Second Amendment right 
had not been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.71  Thus, 
Justice Stevens framed the question as whether the particular right 
asserted by petitioners—to bear arms in the home for the purpose of 
self-defense—applies to the States “because of the Fourteenth 
Amendment itself, standing on its own bottom.”72  Justice Stevens 
then undertook to analyze whether the right to bear arms in the home 
constitutes a “liberty” interest within the meaning of the substantive 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.73  He ultimately 
concluded that on the facts before the Court in this case,  
[h]aving failed to show why their asserted interest is intrinsic to the 
concept of ordered liberty or vulnerable to maltreatment in the 
political arena, [petitioners] have failed to show why “the word 
liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment” should be “held to prevent 
the natural outcome of a dominant opinion” about how to deal with 
the problem of handgun violence in the city of Chicago.74 
Justice Breyer focused his dissenting opinion on whether the right 
to bear arms in the home for self-defense was “sufficiently 
‘fundamental’” to warrant incorporation and “remove it from the 
 
 67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
 68. 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
 69. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3068 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 70. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3090-3103 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 71. See id. at 3088 & n.1.  
 72. Id. at 3103.  
 73. See id. at 3103-07.  
 74. Id. at 3116 (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting)). 
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political process in every state.”75  He was critical of Justice Alito’s 
opinion for relying just on the historical status of the right in 
determining whether it was fundamental to the American scheme of 
justice.76  Breyer wrote that other considerations should bear on the 
calculus, such as: “the nature of the right; any contemporary 
disagreement about whether the right is fundamental; [and] the 
extent to which incorporation [would] further other . . . constitutional 
aims.”77  He concluded that incorporation was not appropriate 
because, among other things, “[i]n sum, the police power, the 
superiority of legislative decisionmaking, the need for local 
decisionmaking, the comparative desirability of democratic 
decisionmaking, the lack of a manageable judicial standard, and the 
life-threatening harm that may flow from striking down regulations 
all argue against incorporation.”78  Justice Breyer went on to write 
that “the important factors that favor incorporation in other 
instances—e.g., the protection of broader constitutional objectives—
are not present here.”79 
V.  ISSUES BEING LITIGATED POST-HELLER AND POST-
MCDONALD 
So, as we just discussed, Heller establishes that the Second 
Amendment protects the right to bear arms in the home for the 
lawful purpose of self-defense,80 and McDonald incorporates that 
right through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
so that it is applicable to the states.81 
In the wake of Heller and McDonald, several issues are being 
litigated across the country.  I would like to close my remarks today 
by highlighting a few of those, and I’m sure your panelists will raise 
others throughout the day. 
One issue being litigated is whether the holding in Heller protects 
gun possession outside of the home.  As Justice Alito in McDonald 
described the central holding in Heller:  “the Second Amendment 
protects a personal right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, 
 
 75. Id. at 3123 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 76. See id. at 3122.  
 77. Id. at 3123. 
 78. Id. at 3129.  
 79. Id.  
 80. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573-626 (2008); supra Part 
III. 
 81. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3028-30, 3031-44; supra Part IV. 
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most notably for self-defense within the home.”82  The question has 
arisen in several litigations of what, if any, Second Amendment 
protections are available outside of the home.83  As noted in some of 
those cases, there is language in Heller that suggests that the right 
also applies to keeping and bearing arms in public.  For example, the 
Court in Heller more generally referred to an individual’s right “to 
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”84  Litigants all 
over the country are arguing both sides—on the one hand that the 
right only attaches to firearms in the home and on the other hand that 
the right extends outside of the home—and I imagine panelists today 
will argue both sides of that issue. 
A second issue that has arisen at the trial court level is what other 
categories of prohibitions or restrictions on gun possession qualify as 
public safety exceptions.  As we discussed, the Supreme Court 
recognized certain public safety exceptions to the reach of the 
protection afforded under the Second Amendment (such as 
forbidding guns in school and prohibiting convicted felons from 
possessing guns), but conceded that list was not necessarily 
exhaustive.85  Whether other categories of gun prohibitions or 
restrictions, if any, fall into the public safety exception is another 
issue that is being litigated in several courts.86 
Finally, parties are litigating over the correct standard of scrutiny 
to apply in analyzing a regulation that prohibits or restricts gun 
possession.87  As I mentioned earlier, the Court in Heller declined to 
set forth a standard of review for gun control laws.88  McDonald also 
did not establish a standard of review.89  Many scholars, and certainly 
 
 82. Id. at 3044.  
 83. See, e.g., United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475–76 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(reserving the question of whether the Second Amendment right to bear arms 
extends outside the home); People v. Aguilar, 944 N.E.2d 816, 827 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2011), leave for appeal granted, 949 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. 2011); Williams v. State, 10 
A.3d 1167, 1177 (Md. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 93 (2011).  
 84. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592.  
 85. See id. at 626-27. 
 86. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 58 F. App’x 980 (4th Cir. 2003) (applying 
public safety exception where officers ask a handcuffed defendant if there is a gun in 
the home); United States v. Reynolds, 334 F. Supp. 2d 909 (W.D. Va. 2004) 
(considering whether public safety exception applies when officers are voluntarily 
given a gun by defendant and ask if defendant has any other weapons in the house). 
 87. See, e.g., Nordyke v. King, 681 F.3d 1041, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) 
(O’Scannlain, J., concurring); Osterweil v. Bartlett, 819 F. Supp. 2d 72, 84 (N.D.N.Y. 
2011).  
 88. See generally Heller, 554 U.S. 570.  
 89. See generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).  
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litigants and courts across the country, have pored over those 
decisions, particularly Heller, to argue which standard of scrutiny is 
suggested by the Court’s opinions.  Some argue that the holding in 
Heller suggests that strict scrutiny applies since it terms the right to 
possess arms in the home for self-defense as a “fundamental right.”90  
On the other hand, some have argued that intermediate scrutiny 
seems to apply because it termed the public safety exceptions to the 
Second Amendment as “presumptively constitutional” whereas under 
strict scrutiny they would presumptively be unconstitutional.91  Some 
have argued for the interest balancing approach that Justice Breyer 
advocated in his dissent in Heller and others have attempted hybrid 
approaches.92 
CONCLUSION 
These are only some of the issues that are being litigated in 
courthouses all over our country post-Heller and McDonald, and I 
am sure the panelists will debate these and other issues throughout 
the day. 
I would again like to thank Fordham Law and the Fordham Urban 
Law Journal for the opportunity to speak with you this morning.  I 
hope you all enjoy the symposium.  Thank you very much. 
 
 
 90. See Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, Colloquy Debate, McDonald 
v. Chicago: Which Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun Control Laws?, 105 
NW. U. L. REV. 437 (2011).   
 91. See, e.g., United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 460 (4th Cir. 2011); 
United States v. Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1170-71 (W.D. Tenn. 2009) (collecting 
cases). 
 92. See State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 407 (Wis. 2012) (reasonableness test); People 
v. Williams, 962 N.E.2d 1148, 1153-54 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (rational basis test).  
